A study of nuclear power plant construction in the United States. by Walden, Robert P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1991
A study of nuclear power plant construction in the
United States.
Walden, Robert P.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/26276

BOOB




A STUDY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
I hesis
\ilzzoz4
BY
ROBERT P. WALDEN
• • «
A REPORT PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COMMITTEE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ENGINEERING
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
SUMMER 1991

A STUDY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
BY
ROBERT P. WALDEN
A REPORT PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COMMITTEE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ENGINEERING
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
SUMMER 1991
T253522
I. I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author wishes to express his appreciation to
those individuals who contributed to the development of
this manuscript. Special thanks are given to my wife,
Bobbilu, and my two children, Jessica and Tyler, for
enduring the past eleven months with me. To my parents,
Mr. and Mrs. Joe P. Walden, I extend a heartfelt thanks
for the many years of encouragement given to me throughout
all of my educational endeavors. I am also gratefully
indebted to the United States Navy for allowing me this
opportunity to further my education and for stirring my
interests in the subject matter of this report. Lastly, a
note of thanks to singer and songwriter, Mr. Jimmy
Buffett, without whose music this effort would have been
extremely boring.
11

ABSTRACT
Construction of nuclear power plants in the United
States has experienced a serious decline during the last
decade and has virtually stopped since 1988. However, the
demand for energy in this country continues to grow at an
alarming rate. The United States possesses the technology
and capital to produce more nuclear-generated electricity.
If the need is there and the technology and money are
available to meet that need, then why has this specialized
industry experienced such a dramatic decline?
The answer to this question is not a simple one. Two
of the primary reasons for the decline in nuclear power
plant construction are: the regulatory demands placed on
the industry by the Federal government, and the public's
perception of safety regarding the nuclear power industry.
The construction of nuclear power plants is obviously
a complex and capital-intensive undertaking. The history
of nuclear power plant construction in the United States
has been one of enormous cost and schedule overruns.
Proponents of nuclear power, within the government and
industry, are attempting to pass new legislation which
will require a one-step licensing procedure and promote a
standard design for all new nuclear plants. The one-step
licensing procedure and the standard design are both major
iii

incentives that may help rejuvenate this specialized
industry.
The purpose of this study is to examine the reasons
for the decline in nuclear power plant construction in the
United States with emphasis on government involvement and
public opinion.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
In 1990, there were 112 nuclear reactor units with
operating permits in the United States. However, the
number of units with construction permits has steadily
declined from 91 in 1979 to four in 1990. Today, there
are currently no new units planned for construction
(18:5)
.
"The United States Department of Energy (DOE) says
the country will have to raise its present generating
capacity of 700 billion watts another 250 billion watts by
2010" (6:56). This increase is equivalent to the
generating capacity of 250 nuclear power units. The DOE
has also estimated that the United States will need an
additional 1,250 billion watts of generating capacity by
the year 2030. Further compounding the need is the
realization that many existing nuclear plants, which were
designed for forty years, will have their operating
licenses removed during the coming decade (6:56).
As our energy needs increase and foreign sources of
oil become less reliable the Federal government is
providing increased support for new legislation that would
ease the current regulatory climate governing nuclear

power plant design, construction, and operation. The
proposed legislation calls for a one-step licensing
process to be completed prior to commencing construction.
Current regulations require one permit to be issued for
construction and one permit to be issued for operation of
the plant. This two-step procedure also requires a public
hearing before each of the licenses is issued (9:1).
The Bush Administration has also requested that key
suppliers of nuclear plants build them to a standard
design. The advantages of standardization are obviously:
cost efficiency, better maintainability, and ease of
repair. A likely candidate for standard design is the
modular high-temperature gas cooled reactor (MHTGR)
(6:55)
.
Problem Statement
The number of nuclear power plants under construction
in the United States peaked in 1979 and since that time
nuclear power plant construction has stopped. Utility
companies ordered their last new power plant in 1978
(6:54). Licensing and regulation by the Federal
government has become such an extensive process that the
most recent units placed into operation in 1989 and 1990
had an average construction time of approximately 17 years
(18:12) .
Nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
have created a strong "rallying cry" for opponents of
nuclear power and have had tremendous negative impact on

the growth of the industry. Public opinion, cost
overruns, and legislative overkill have forced utility
companies in the United States to abandon 12 nuclear
plants since 1974. Amazingly, more nuclear plants have
been abandoned than are currently in operation. The total
costs of abandonment are estimated in the hundreds of
billions of dollars (6:56).
Nuclear power plant construction has historically
experienced enormous cost and schedule overruns. Some of
the problems with cost and schedule can be attributed to
the constantly changing government regulations regarding
siting, design, and licensing. However, other factors
have also influenced cost and schedule negatively. Among
these factors are: overall poor construction management,
quality control and quality assurance problems, and poor
public relations by the utility companies and the
industry.
Report Objective
This paper will examine the reasons for decline in
nuclear power plant construction in the United States with
major emphasis on government involvement and the public's
perception of safety in the industry. The current status
of construction and the possible reactivation of abandoned
plants will also be reviewed. From a construction
management viewpoint: safety, quality assurance and
control, contracting systems, cost control, and scheduling

will be studied to provide insight into how these factors
contributed to the current state of the industry.
Current issues regarding future energy needs,
radioactive waste disposal, design standardization, and
legislative reform will be discussed relative to their
role in possible rejuvenation of the nuclear power plant
construction industry.

CHAPTER 2
LICENSING AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM
"The regulatory process affects the industry by
lengthening the time between planning a new generating
facility and placing it in operation, by retroactive
changes in plant design arising from the unigue
surveillance responsibility of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and by providing a special forum for public
opposition to nuclear plants" (12:278).
The above statement indicates that one of the
critical areas affecting construction of nuclear power
plants is licensing and government regulations covering
the construction and operation of the power plants.
Proponents of nuclear power claim that the licensing
process and the current regulations are key areas that
must be reformed in order for the industry to experience
revitalization.
The licensing procedures and regulations governing
the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power
plants is contained in Title 10, Chapter 50 of the United
States Code of Federal Regulations. Prior to starting
construction on a nuclear project the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission must issue a construction permit (17:532).

The licensing process for construction contains four
major steps. The first step is the filing and acceptance
of the application by the NRC. This document usually
consists of fifteen or more volumes of material and is
known as the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR)
.
The PSAR is prepared and submitted by the utility company
or owner and shows in detail the design assumptions and
limitations of the proposed plant. Along with the PSAR
the owner files an Environmental Report (ER) . The time
required to prepare these two documents can take up to two
years (4:352)
.
The second stage in obtaining the construction permit
consists of a review of the PSAR and ER by the NRC. This
review process takes approximately eighteen months. The
NRC staff reviews safety, environmental safeguards, and
antitrust issues. The third step is a more comprehensive
safety review by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety
(ACRS) . The ACRS is commissioned by the NRC, but is an
independent agency. This review is required by federal
statute (4: 352)
.
The last step in the construction licensing process
is a mandatory public hearing by the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board (ASLB) . This board is composed of three
members - a chairman and two technical advisors, all with
expertise in environmental and nuclear technology. This
portion of the licensing procedure varies drastically in
duration depending upon those who are interested in seeing

the plant built or those who are not interested in seeing
the plant built. These public hearings have varied in
length from one day to three years (4:352).
The time involved in obtaining a construction permit
is a great source of frustration to the nuclear industry.
This chapter will focus on how the licensing process has
affected the industry and the push for legislative reform
that is currently ongoing to alleviate the problem.
The existing licensing process requires two public
hearings and two separate licenses - one prior to granting
the utility a construction permit and another before the
plant can begin operation. This dual licensing process,
which allows the public to intervene at critical steps,
has caused many of the cost and schedule overruns
associated with the construction of nuclear power plants.
For example, the second round of public hearings (required
before the issuance of an operating license) kept the
Seabrook Nuclear Power Station in New Hampshire idle for
three years. This delay cost the owner over $1 billion in
interest and other expenses (6:61).
As can be seen by this illustration, the nuclear
licensing process is not only a political issue, but also
a serious economic issue that will directly affect how
much America pays for electricity for the first half of
the 21st century. A recent analysis by the United States
Council on Energy Awareness (USCEA) compared the cost of
electricity from four electric generating options -

nuclear, coal, gas, and oil. The analysis showed that the
nuclear plant could produce electricity for 4.3
cents/kilowatt hour (kwh) . This compares to 4.8 cents/kwh
for the coal plant, 6.1 cents/kwh for the gas fired plant,
and 8.1 cents/kwh for the oil fired plant (11:42).
The results of this analysis were based on the key
assumption that new advanced nuclear energy plants would
be built under stable regulatory conditions. Stable
regulatory conditions means that standardized designs will
be utilized and that all regulatory issues (including
siting, design, and emergency planning) will be settled
before construction starts and not afterwards. The USCEA
analysis also assumed that plants built to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's rigid specifications will be
allowed to start up upon completion of construction, and
will not be subject to lengthy public hearings which cause
costly delays (11:42).
The results showing nuclear power as the most
economical means of electrical generation may be hard to
believe considering the costs of recently completed
plants. (To provide a common ground of measurement,
nuclear power plant construction costs are measured in
dollars per kilowatt (kwe) of peaktime generating
capacity.) The first plants completed in 1968 averaged
$161/kwe. Five units completed in 1988 averaged over
$3 000/kwe. This amounts to an 1800% increase in a twenty
year period. By comparison the consumer price index (the
8

Federal government's measure of annual inflation) only
increased by about 3 00% in the same period. There is no
doubt that the demanding regulations and the lengthy
licensing process have had a major effect on the cost
increases (18:11).
The main concern of utility companies is not the
regulations themselves but the fact that the process lacks
stability and predictability. When planning for capital
investments of the magnitude of a nuclear power plant it
becomes important to be able to accurately estimate all
the costs associated with the project. This has been
almost impossible because of constantly changing
regulations and public involvement in the licensing
procedure. The two-step licensing procedure that is
currently used requires utilities to take a huge financial
risk on a design that is not completed and finally
approved until the plant is constructed. The lack of a
standardized design has also contributed to some of the
differences in the licensing procedure (19:2).
The costs for constructing a nuclear power plant have
escalated rapidly during the last two decades, at a much
higher rate than inflation. This escalation has been
partly due to changes and additions to plant designs
required by regulations for improved safety or
environmental protection. Because of the uncertainty of
these changes, which often result in completed costs
orders of magnitude higher than the original estimate,

utility companies have been reluctant to plan for and fund
any new reactors (12:263).
Under the existing law construction begins before the
plant design is completed. Critical decisions on approval
of the plant design are often made after construction has
begun. This process is extremely inefficient, increases
the overall costs dramatically, and has forced many
projects to be abandoned after owner's have sunk millions
and sometimes billions of dollars into construction
(19:2) .
Part of the increased costs related to regulation can
be associated with the contractor and owner attempting to
cover risks that are uninsurable. As previously stated,
regulatory changes frequently cause changes in design,
which result in rework and delays or shutdowns in the
construction schedule. Also related to risk management
are the costs associated with risk due to delays in
licensing that may occur once construction has been
completed. The costs for these risks are included as
contingencies in the construction schedule of prices and
this is standard in the industry (12:272).
By comparison, fossil fuel plants usually require
eight to ten years from the start of planning to
completion of construction, nuclear plants are now
averaging over seventeen years. A large portion of this
additional time is because of the extensive reviews
required for nuclear plants prior to construction. This
10

extra time costs money and increases the uncertainty of
meeting the original target cost of construction. The
nuclear industry would very much like to shorten the time
period used by the licensing process. Since the industry
is regulated by law, this will only be accomplished
through legislative reform (12:278).
As can be expected in a democratic country, the
public has great influence over matters affecting public
safety. Congress is certainly attuned to this and has
created laws and a bureaucratic agency to regulate all
facets of the nuclear power industry. The regulations
themselves have been proven capable of being met. The
actual regulations have not caused the decline experienced
by the industry. The problem has been the numerous
changes in regulations that are imposed on the owner,
designer, construction-manager, and contractors during the
construction phase. These changes are much more expensive
to implement during the construction phase then they would
have been during design. Each change in regulations
increases the opportunity for further legal and
administrative interventions during the life of the
project. This is especially true during the public
hearing held before the operating license is obtained
(12:278)
.
Another area of frustration is the ability to the
public to intervene during the licensing process.
"Interventions have been used to increase opposition to
11

nuclear power, and in some cases, have forced postponement
or cancellation of nuclear power plants, either by
generating resistance in the region affected, or by delays
that bring the economics of the plant into guestion"
(12:278). The same individuals questioning the economics
of a particular plant during a public hearing often do not
realize that they are directly contributing to the cost
inefficiencies by delaying either the construction or
operation of the plant.
While it has been good from a safety standpoint to
have a strong regulatory environment surrounding this
industry, from an economic standpoint it has been a major
liability. However, a competent and independent
regulatory agency is also necessary to ensure any
resemblance of public acceptance of nuclear power. Public
opinion and acceptance of this industry must be changed
drastically from what currently exists if nuclear power is
to make a comeback (12:279).
Legislative Reform
In February 1991, President Bush published his new
energy policy. Included in this policy is a proposal to
speed up the procedure for licensing the next generation
of nuclear plants. This "streamlining" process places
limits on the public's ability to comment on new plants
and the ability of state utility commissions to regulate
them. The proposed legislation also limits a state's
12

ability to comment on the location of disposal sites for
radioactive wastes (13:2G).
As of April 1991, this legislation had won approval
from the Senate Energy Committee. A clear majority of the
committee members endorsed the new legislation. The key
points of the new legislation are: a one step licensing
procedure to occur before construction begins, twenty year
renewals on operating licenses for existing plants, and
commitment of government funds to conduct research for
developing modern, standardized plant designs (9:1).
Because of recent events in the Persian Gulf and
increased concern over the emission of carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere, the current administration, the utility
companies, and the scientific community are taking a
second look at the many advantages of nuclear power as an
energy resource for this country during the next century.
Utility companies are well aware of the capabilities
of nuclear power, but are reluctant to expend further
resources until the Federal government stabilizes the
regulatory process so that costs and schedules can be
planned within a reasonable probability of being on target
upon completion.
The history of construction in this industry has
shown that the probability of being on target for cost and
schedule has been much less than reasonable. The main
reason for this is the current licensing process. The
President and some members of Congress have recognized
13

this and are attempting to correct the problem through
legislative reform. If the new legislation is passed it
will certainly provide the prime impetus in revitalizing
the industry.
The USCEA analysis, previously mentioned in this
chapter, "shows that with licensing reform and a stable
regulatory climate, nuclear plants can be one of the least
cost ways to meet future electricity needs. As a result,
consumers of electricity would be the main beneficiaries
of a more stable regulatory and licensing system for
future nuclear plants" (11:42).
As with most economic issues in the United States,
costs will drive the market. If the licensing system does
improve and costs can be reasonably predicted and
controlled on nuclear power plants, then utility companies
will once again start planning and constructing more of
them.
When asked about the need for nuclear power during
the coming decade, Mr. Alan Stoga, a member of the Board
of Directors of Kissinger and Associates (a geopolitical
and economic consulting firm) , had these comments:
We need to get away from our dependence,
not just on foreign oil, but on oil. To the
extent we can replace oil with non-oil sources,
we ought to do so. There, I think, is where we
have to re-examine the role nuclear power plays
in our energy mix. I find it criminal—and that
really is the best word—that we have abandoned
nuclear power for all practical purposes.
The federal and state governments should be
in the business, not of preventing nuclear power
at any cost, but of providing the regulatory,
14

the safety, the economic framework in which
sensible investment decisions can be made. They
have not been. Rather, they have been crusaders
with a mission to discourage, and prevent,
additions of nuclear power to the nation's
energy resource stock. We need to create a
regulatory process that offers the opportunity
to license new facilities. We need to create a
system where the chances of approval at the end
of the day justify the massive investment at the
start of the day, and that really is the role of
the federal government (11:49).
15

CHAPTER 3
STANDARDIZATION
With few exceptions, the 112 nuclear reactors built
in the United States have been custom-designed and custom-
built. Almost all of the 112 licensed plants are one of a
kind. Building one of a kind plants on a design-as-you-
build basis has resulted in both safety problems and
escalating construction costs. These two issues have
resulted in a lack of investor and public confidence in
nuclear power (19:1).
The United States House of Representatives ' Committee
on Energy and Power held hearings in May of 1988 to
discuss the issue of nuclear power plant standardization.
The committee hearings involved many people from the
industry and the scientific community. The findings from
the hearings indicated that standardization was a "good"
idea and that Congress should enact legislation to
encourage standardization in the industry (19:1).
There is enormous financial risk involved on the part
of the utility companies and owners with the current two-
step licensing procedure. The use of standardized designs
would reduce that risk and help revitalize the use of
nuclear power as a profitable electricity-generating
option. The custom design approach has led to numerous
16

reactors of great variability and diversity. The
variability has created differences in the licensing of
nuclear power plants and difficulties in transferring
experience and materials from one plant to another (19:2).
Standard designs can reduce the cost of new plants
and improve their safety. This is realized through
improvements in training, operation, and maintenance that
can be readily shared between facilities. Also,
standardized designs provide additional assurance that all
major elements of a nuclear power plant are produced to
exacting requirements and that these requirements have
been subject to a complete public review process.
Standardization allows for a more efficient and
expeditious review process and thorough understanding of
the designs by the NRC. Each of these effects of
standardization relate to reduced overall costs (19:2).
Newly introduced legislation in the House of
Representatives calls for the pre-approval of standardized
design and a combined construction permit-operating
license hearing for the design. Unlike existing
legislation, plant construction would not begin until
after the design has been fully reviewed and approved.
This approach will enhance safety, decrease the cost of
nuclear power plant construction, and hopefully, give the
industry a much needed boost in construction starts
(19:2) .
17

Regulation is one of many reasons why nuclear power
plant construction has experienced zero growth in recent
years. Standardization plays a key role in regulatory
reform. However, whether or not there is regulatory
reform, utility companies, out of economic necessity, must
look at standardization as a means of reducing spiraling
construction costs (19:3).
Standardization is not the only answer to
revitalizing the industry. Problems with public
acceptance and investor concerns must also be overcome.
These two areas can be relieved by the use of standardized
designs because this will result in lower costs and safer
plants. However, standardization through regulatory
changes must be done carefully so as not to agitate these
two groups any more than they already have been (19:3).
If standardized designs are going to be used, which
design should be chosen? There are a number of good
designs that have been built and operated during the past
thirty years. However, they have all experienced
problems. It would be too easy with the existing designs
for somebody to find something that should be built
better, or to require some backfitting. Therefore, a look
at alternatives in new technology should be done to pick
the best design or group of designs from which to chose
(19:4) .
There are currently two design alternatives that are
available that provide for the most advantages in terms of
18

standardization. They are: the advanced light water
reactor (which is basically an improvement over most of
the current reactors) and the modular high temperature
gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) (19:4).
The advanced light water reactors are in the design
stage now. The designs are being accomplished by
Westinghouse, General Electric, and Combustion
Engineering. The first two companies are cooperating with
Japanese firms in their designs. The new design is
significantly safer, from an operating standpoint, than
existing plants. The risk factor for a catastrophic
accident occurring has been lowered by a factor of ten
with this design. This is a significant accomplishment
(19:4) .
These advanced reactors will be designed to be more
easily operated and therefore, less susceptible to
disruptions and shutdowns. This, in turn, results in a
more stabilizing licensing environment, meaning the
license should be more easily obtainable upon completion
of construction, because there are fewer opportunities for
things to go wrong. The ease of licensing efforts means
less risks for the owner, less delay time between
completion of construction and operation, and more
importantly, a lower and more stable overall cost (19:4).
These designs will be available for construction in a
few years. In all probability the Japanese will construct
the first one, so the United States will have an
19

"experiment" to analyze if we chose this option. It is
not clear what the public opinion will be since this
design is only a modernization of the most prevalent
design in operation today (19:5).
The modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor uses
helium gas as a heat transport medium rather than water.
This design centers on loading modular fuel units, capable
of withstanding extremely high temperatures (3300 degrees
Fahrenheit) , into reactor vessels small enough that they
do not hold enough fuel to cause a "meltdown" of the
reactor core if all the helium gas escaped. The helium
transports the heat from the fission process to a gas
turbine, which provides the motion for the electric
generator to produce electricity (6:58).
This particular design has been the only one to
receive support from the Union of Concerned Scientists,
which is a group of scientists, researchers, and
academicians that has traditionally opposed the use of
nuclear power in any form. Proponents of the design state
that it is "idiot-proof" and "inherently-safe," mainly
because it relies on the laws of physics and not human
intervention to prevent a major accident. One significant
drawback to this design is the lack of a containment
vessel which makes it vulnerable to terrorist attack and
sabotage. From a public perception standpoint, if a
reactor which is advertised as inherently safe ever
experiences a major accident, public confidence in that
20

technology might never recover, especially in the United
States (6: 58)
.
The French have proven that standardized designs are
less costly and can be built quicker. France generates
75% of its electricity from nuclear power, more than any
other country in the world. They have used a standardized
reactor since the mid-1970' s. The average construction
time has been six to eight years. This compares to a
current average time of seventeen years in this country.
France's nuclear engineers and operators can work on any
of the country's fifty-five nuclear plants. The cost
efficiency and safety value of standardization is self-
evident (6:55)
.
The Bush Administration has recognized their
importance and is supporting the use of standardized
designs, both financially and politically. The United
States Department of Energy (DOE) has invested more than
$160 million during the past five years to assist in
developing a new generation of advanced reactors with
standardized designs. General Electric, Westinghouse, and
other participants in the program have also invested over
$70 million for this effort. The administration wants at
least four designs ready for utilities to choose from by
1995 (6:61)
.
Currently, the Federal Regulations regarding nuclear
power plant construction and operation allow for the
following standardization options: duplicate design,
21

replicate design, reference design, and license to
manufacture (17:526).
Duplicate Design allows for a single review of the
construction license application for two or more plants.
The plants have the same design and will be constructed in
a specified time frame at different sites. The only
difference in design allowed are those related to site
adaptability. One set of drawings is prepared and all
equipment is procured at the same time. Therefore, each
unit that is built has the same make and model of all
major items (10:471).
Replicate Design is nearly an exact replication of a
previously established design constructed at a later time
at the same site or a different site under separate
license applications. Equipment is procured to the same
performance specification as used in the original design,
but may have some variations because of different
manufacturers (10:471).
Reference Design allows the design of an entire
plant, or major systems of the plant, to be reviewed with
the intent of being standardized for use in subsequent
plant applications. The second and subsequent
applications would merely reference the first (10:471).
The license to manufacture concept provides for a
licensing review of several facilities that are to be
constructed at a location different from where the plant
will operate. The licensing review and hearings are
22

limited to site-related questions. This idea applies
primarily to barge mounted off-shore power plants
(10:471)
.
All of the above options are available and provide
for some degree of standardization. They all still
require two-step licensing. The intent of the legislative
reform currently in progress is to use the reference
design option with a one step licensing procedure. This
concept hinges on finding a design flexible enough to be
adapted for sites almost anywhere in the United States.
The sound economic sense of using nuclear power
plants that are uniformly standardized, built on a
reliable schedule with a firm price, as part of this
country's energy policy has been clearly demonstrated.
Project managers overseas and in the United States have
constructed power plants in six years or less.
The construction methodology and technology for
building the six year plant exists, however the industry-
wide commitment to make it happen consistently in the
United States is severely lacking. The utility companies
and the government are showing a greater awareness toward
increasing nuclear power generating capacity. To
accomplish this, everyone involved in the industry—the
utility companies, the manufacturers, Federal and state
regulators, the financial community, and the politicians
—
must form a long term partnership based on shared risk and
shared rewards. This partnership would be based on the
23

fundamental concept that a nuclear power plant will be
constructed in six years with a firm fixed price (2:646).
For the six year process to work the partners must
agree on: the need for additional power capacity,
extensive pre-construction design and planning, financial
backing and risk sharing, firm price bidding with
financial incentives based on performance, reduction of
regulatory uncertainties, streamlining of the licensing
process, and early identification and resolution of
potential risk issues (2:647).
The first and most important step in making this
process work is legislative reform requiring only one-step
licensing and the use of standardized designs. The use of
standardized designs will reduce costs, increase safety,
and provide the public with the needed assurance that
nuclear power is both safe and economical.
24

CHAPTER 4
THE PUBLIC'S PERCEPTION
"Nuclear power. The words conjure first the hellish
explosion at Chernobyl that spewed a radioactive cloud
across the Ukraine and Europe five years ago, poisoning
crops, spawning bizarre mutant livestock, killing dozens
of people and exposing millions more to dangerous fallout.
Then the words summon up Three Mile Island and the threat
of a meltdown that spread panic across Pennsylvania's
rolling countryside seven years earlier. From these grew
the alarming television programs, the doomsday books, and
the terrifying movies. Could any technology survive all
that? It seemed this one couldn't." This is part of the
opening paragraph for the cover story of the April 29,
1991, issue of Time magazine entitled "Time to Choose"
(6:56)
.
In this paragraph a gloomy and dreadful picture is
painted concerning nuclear power. The two major accidents
that occurred, one in the Soviet Union and the other in
the United States, have had an overwhelming effect on the
nuclear power industry. Opponents of nuclear power have
used these two events to their advantage. Opposition to
nuclear power is well-organized. Every opportunity is
taken by the opposition to inform the public about the
25

negative aspects of nuclear power. Conversely, the
nuclear power proponents, including the industry, do not
have an organized public relations campaign.
Conseguently, the majority of public opinion has been
against any further development of nuclear power.
This chapter will attempt to review three key issues
that relate to the public's perception about nuclear
power. These issues are: safety, effects on the
environment, and cost. Because of their ability to
intervene during the licensing hearing, winning the
public's opinion in favor of the growth of nuclear power
is crucial to nuclear power plant construction. Public
challenges made during licensing phases are one of the key
causes of cost and schedule overruns.
The nuclear power industry must convince the public
that the new plants that are built will be safe and have
fewer problems. This will be a crucial challenge, for
without public support this industry will surely fail. A
Time/CNN poll conducted in April, 1991, showed that 32% of
1,000 adults surveyed strongly opposed building more
nuclear plants in the United States, 18% were strongly in
favor of building more (6:55). Conversely, a New York
Times/CBS News opinion survey conducted in June, 1991,
found that 41% of the 1424 adults polled were in favor of
building more nuclear power plants. However, this
percentage is down from the 46% who said they would
approve in April, 1979, one month after the Three Mile
26

Island accident, and significantly lower than the 69% who
said they would approve in July, 1979 (20:3A).
The Time/CNN poll of April, 1991, also asked which
energy source the United States should rely on most to
meet increased energy needs in the next decade.
Surprisingly, 40% of the respondents chose nuclear power,
25% chose oil, and 22% named coal. The contradiction of
not wanting to build more nuclear plants, but choosing it
as a viable energy resource is probably due to the "not in
my backyard" syndrome. Many people want nuclear power as
long as it is generated somewhere else. 60% of those
asked stated that a new nuclear power plant in their
community would be unacceptable, while 34% said it would
be acceptable (6:56).
The public does not want nuclear power in their
backyards because of the perception that nuclear plants
are unsafe. Public concern about nuclear power safety has
centered on four key issues: the safety of routine
operation of the nuclear fuel cycle and of reactors, the
possibility and effects of a major nuclear accident, the
disposal of radioactive wastes, and the production of
nuclear weapons from byproducts of nuclear-powered
facilities. Each of these issues is important to the
public, however, from the viewpoint of effects on
construction, only the first three are considered in this
report (12:215)
.
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Reactor safety is assured in the United States
through a concept known as "defense-in depth." Nuclear
power plants are designed, built, and operated under this
concept. The regulations are also set-up to enforce the
defense-in depth concept (3:316).
This concept has three key elements. First is the
philosophy that the designer contemplates all accidents
that he or she thinks have a significant probability of
occurring, and designs against them. This includes
intrinsically safe designs and engineered systems.
Intrinsically safe means that the fundamental laws of
physics are used for protection against accidents rather
than human intervention. Second, the assumption is made
that despite all good efforts in design, accidents will
happen anyway, therefore redundancy must be built into the
design. The third element is reactor design and siting to
mitigate the consequences of accidents if the first two
elements fail. Examples of this are: use of containment
buildings to prevent release of radioactive material into
the environment in the case of an accident, use of remote
sites, and the filtering of airborne releases to reduce
their magnitude (3:317).
One of the key design features of reactors in the
United States is multiple barriers against the release of
radioactive materials from the fuel. There are four
barriers between the fission products in the fuel and the
environment. First, the fuel is held together in a matrix
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of ceramic-like material that basically immobilizes the
fission products. Second, the fuel cladding retains any
fission products that migrate from this fuel matrix.
Third, the reactor primary vessel keeps fission products
that escape the fuel cladding from leaving the reactor.
Last is a containment building that encloses the entire
reactor and the primary and secondary coolant systems.
The effectiveness of each of these barriers is a major
element in safe reactor design and operation (3:317).
Three other important areas must also be considered
when designing a safe reactor. First is the ability to
shut down the chain reaction and keep it shut down, this
is known as the "scram" mechanism. The second area is
maintaining structural integrity of the fuel, the primary
coolant system, the containment building, and other
equipment. Seismic, hurricane, and internally-generated
reactor forces must be considered to ensure structural
integrity. Lastly, the need for residual heat removal
after a reactor scram is absolutely critical (3:317).
Unlike fossil-fired plants, nuclear plants cannot
fully extinguish the heat generated from the chain
reaction. A large amount of fissionable material remains
in the reactor core after a scram and this produces heat
as it undergoes radioactive decay. This decay heat must
be removed or the reactor core will rise in temperature to
the point where fuel damage will occur and release more
and more radioactivity. This decay heat is removed
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through the use of a long range heat sink. The removal of
decay heat is one of the most vital issues in recovering
from any reactor accident (3:317).
The reliance on automatic features and human
operators is also an inherent design feature in the United
States. Reactor designers have recognized that many
safety-related functions work best if they are automated.
They have also realized that some human intervention is
also essential for safety. This is because the complexity
of possible accident sequences is far too great to be
controlled totally by automation. In the long run, human
judgment, with its versatility and analytical powers,
produces safer operation (3:318).
The possibility and effects of a major nuclear
accident is the second key safety issue affecting public
concern. From the public's viewpoint, the issue here is
whether or not nuclear power is worth the risks that are
involved. The nuclear industry defines risk, as related
to reactor safety, to be the product of consequences times
their probability of occurring. The public generally
thinks in terms of large risks, which means large
consequences or large probabilities, or both. The safety
record of the nuclear industry has shown that the most
frequent accidents have small consequences, therefore, the
public's perception of the risks of nuclear power have
been exaggerated (3:325).
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The public needs to understand that even large
accidents in the majority of reactors operating in the
United States today are not analogous to the explosion of
a nuclear weapon. No explosion or release of neutrons
occurs, buildings outside the reactor plant are not
physically damaged, nor are any fires started. Any damage
to property, ground, or water that occurs is due to
radioactive contamination. The danger to humans is the
inhalation or ingestion of radioactive substances or
gases, or irradiation from substances released to the
atmosphere or deposited on the ground (12:460).
In 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducted
a study on reactor safety risk assessment. The findings
from this study were published in a report known in the
industry as the Rasmussen Report or WASH-1400 (12:216).
The report stated that the risks of a major accident
occurring that would cause large numbers of casualties are
extremely small. The study showed that the probability is
so small that it is not normally within the range of risks
that are considered (12:217).
The WASH-14 00 report was criticized for several
reasons. The two main reasons were: casualty figures for
the most severe types of accidents were underestimated,
and accident frequencies were overestimated. However, if
both of these figures from the study are altered to make a
more conservative estimate, the risk of reactor accidents
still remains small enough when compared to other man-
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caused events (i.e. airplane crashes, fires, explosions)
that nuclear power is still an acceptable means of
generating electricity for this country (12:217). The
nuclear industry must develop a program for educating the
public on the actual risks that are involved so that
public opinion is not swayed by the emotionalism and
misinformation that is prevalent in the opinions of the
opponents of nuclear power.
Despite the public's perception, the nuclear power
industry maintains a remarkable safety record. There have
been no large releases of radioactivity, no core
meltdowns, no radioactivity-induced prompt fatalities, and
excellent control of routine emissions during almost three
decades of commercial reactor operation. This impressive
record indicates the efficiency of the nuclear program in
the United States and the dedication of those people in
the industry who are committed to making nuclear power a
safe energy alternative (3:323).
The last area of safety that appears as a threat to
the public is disposal of radioactive waste. The public
is understandably apprehensive about the ability of
institutions and the industry to manage or dispose of
radioactive waste. The main concern is the possibility of
the release of this radioactivity into the atmosphere
after the waste is stored (6:57).
Radioactive material remains in fuel rods that are no
longer economical to use. Most of these fission products
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(i.e. strontium 90 and cesium 137) have half-lifes of
about 3 years. However, others such as plutonium, have
half-lifes of up to 1000 to 10,000 years. With 112
reactors operating, the amount of radioactive waste is
growing fast (6:57).
High-level waste from power plants in the United
States has accumulated to 17,000 tons in thirty years.
The same number of coal-fired plants operating for thirty
years, under the current emission standards, would produce
over 1 billion cubic feet of ash, 100 million tons of
sulfur dioxide, and 1 billion tons of carbon dioxide
(8:23) .
The amount of waste that currently exists would fill
all of the available storage space in the United States.
The government and the industry have made little progress
in developing facilities for storing this waste. However,
Congress, in 1988, selected Yucca Mountain in Nevada as
the site for a permanent storage area. Unfortunately, the
State of Nevada has fought the plan so fervently that if
the site opens at all, it will not be until 2010 (6:57).
Most experts agree that the waste problem can be
handled with relative ease. The spent fuel rods can be
vitrified and buried in steel containers thousands of feet
below the ground. Highly accurate predictions have been
made when nuclear waste is involved. Even though the
risks are no more than encountered in everyday life, no
one can guarantee that a disposal site would remain intact
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for this long, or that groundwater intrusion would not
occur. The public wants an absolute guarantee that the
waste will never escape from the containers. Until this
guarantee is made, public fears will not be overcome.
"There will be no nuclear renaissance until a waste-
disposal program exists that passes some common sense test
of public credibility and acceptability" (6:57).
From an environmental standpoint, nuclear energy is
the cleanest source of electricity currently available for
large-scale growth. Nuclear reactor plants do not emit
sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, or
"greenhouse" gases such as carbon dioxide. More stringent
air pollution regulations that are being enacted have no
negative impact on the cost of nuclear power. The
continued use of nuclear power helps prevent large amounts
of air pollution annually. It has been estimated that the
use of nuclear power in 1989 alone reduced emissions of
sulfur oxides by 5 million tons, nitrogen oxides by 2
million tons, and carbon dioxide by 128 million tons
(1:17)
.
Another factor affecting the public's opinion of
nuclear power is the staggering costs involved with
construction. Unfortunately, one of the methods employed
by utility companies to raise capital costs for
construction is a rate increase. It is difficult for the
common consumer to understand why he or she has
experienced a medium term (3 to 5 year) rate increase to
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pay for a nuclear power plant that may be completed in 15
to 2 years so rates will then go down.
Also of concern are the enormous amounts of money
that have been sunk into nuclear power plants only to have
the plant construction stopped or the plant abandoned
after completion because of a licensing challenge. Some
examples are: the Long Island Lighting Company of New
York gave up on trying to obtain a license on its
completed $5.5 billion Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant in
1989. The reason for abandonment was local authorities
refused to approve the company's plans for evacuation in
the event of a major accident. The State of New York
plans to buy the plant for $1 and have it dismantled at a
cost of $186 million. A regional utility company in
Indiana stopped construction on a nuclear plant in 1984
after sinking $2.7 billion (6:56).
The financial brokerage firm, Merrill Lynch, has
estimated that abandoned nuclear projects in the United
States has cost utility stockholders $10 billion. "The
first utility that announces plans to build a new nuclear
reactor will see its stock dumped" says Leonard Hyman,
Merrill Lynch' s expert on electric utilities.
Stockholders are still trying to recover from their first
experience with losses. "There is no demand for new
plants, because no one wants to spend the next 10 years in
court or being picketed" states Hyman (6:57).
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Nuclear power has been and probably will remain a
controversial issue in the United States. Despite the
polls that have shown that the majority of Americans think
nuclear power is our most promising source of energy for
the future, there exists a significant faction of strong
opposition to it. These opponents of nuclear power will
likely continue their efforts to persuade the public to
abandon this source of energy. Nuclear power opponents
are highly organized and maintain a well-established
information network. The bulk of the information that is
circulated is highly partisan, but contains just enough
facts to keep the opposition much better informed about
nuclear power than the general public (12:260).
The fight for survival of the nuclear industry in the
United States is mostly a contest among groups in our
society, and not the public as a whole. The leadership of
the anti-nuclear movement is clearly in the hands of
environmental organizations. The proponents of nuclear
power are led by industries and professional associations
within the nuclear power field. Each group is trying to
gain public support (12:260).
The scientific community plays a critical role in the
nuclear power debate for two reasons. First, scientists
are found on both sides of the issue. Second, both sides
of the issue are eager to get scientific support for their
viewpoint. More importantly, scientists are held in high
public esteem in regard to nuclear power, much more than
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either of the other two groups. One factor affecting
public opinion is that scientists themselves are not
decided on the need for nuclear power in respect to the
risks involved (12:261).
How has the public's perception of nuclear power
affected the construction of nuclear power plants? As
mentioned in Chapter 2, the current licensing procedures
allow for the public to intervene during both of the steps
reguired in the two step process. The law reguires that a
public hearing be held prior to the issuance of the
construction permit and also prior to the issuance of the
operating license. "Interventions have been used to build
up opposition to nuclear power, and in some cases, have
forced postponement or cancellation of nuclear plants,
either by generating resistance in the region affected, or
by delays that bring the economics of the plant into
guestion" (12:278)
The most effective method of combatting the opponents
of nuclear power is through education. If the current
administration and the nuclear power industry want to
experience additional growth, they must develop together a
comprehensive plan of educating the public on:
1. The amazingly low risks of nuclear power when
compared to the risks of everyday life.
2. The remarkable safety record of the industry.
3
.
The technology that exists for the proper and
safe disposal of radioactive waste and the real
risks associated with this technology.
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4. Why construction costs have skyrocketed, and the
long term consequences on electricity rates if
nuclear power is not allowed to reach its full
potential.
5. The positive effects on the environment if
nuclear power is allowed to grow.
These points must be made totally clear to the public if
nuclear power is to survive. Also, the fifteen years of
misinformation publicized by the opposition must be
dispelled in order for the public to really understand
what it needs to know to make intelligent decisions
regarding nuclear power.
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CHAPTER 5
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL
"Man has been interested in quality construction for
many years" (4:349). However, nuclear power plants have
had much more emphasis on quality in construction than on
typical construction projects. This added emphasis is
necessary because of the fuel that is used in a nuclear
power plant. Since radioactive fuel is used, extreme care
must be taken to ensure that accidents are prevented from
occurring during plant operation. One method of providing
the necessary care is to ensure that quality materials and
sound construction practices are used during the
construction of the plant (4:369).
Because of the tremendous potential for damage and
the number of lives that may be affected by an accident,
the Federal government has established certain standards
to ensure that nuclear power plants are constructed with
the necessary quality to provide for safe operation. This
level of government involvement is not found on typical
construction projects. For this reason, nuclear power
plant construction has a unique position in the
construction industry (4:350).
The principal focus of this chapter will be on
quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) , and the
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effects of these two areas on the industry. A review of
the NRC's role and the requirements of the federal
regulations governing nuclear power plant quality
assurance is necessary in order to understand how the QA/
QC program affects the overall outcome of construction.
Also, the owner's involvement in QA and how QA is
integrated into projects is discussed. Finally, problems
with the current QA regulations are reviewed to emphasize
that improvements in this area are also necessary if the
industry is to experience additional growth.
Title 10, Part 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
which governs the construction and operation of commercial
nuclear power plants, defines quality assurance and
quality control as follows:
Quality Assurance—All those planned and
systematic actions necessary to provide adequate
confidence that a structure, system, or
component will perform satisfactorily in
service.
Quality Control—Those quality assurance actions
related to the physical characteristic of
material, structure, component, or system which
provide a means to control the quality of the
material, structure, component, or system to
predetermined requirements (17:621).
The primary purpose of the quality assurance program
in nuclear power plant construction is to provide
assurance that the health and safety of the public will
not be endangered during the operation of the plant. QA
affects every aspect of the engineering, construction, and
operation of the plant. It is based on a logical, step by
step method of assuring that the design meets the plant
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criteria and that the intent of the designer is met during
construction. To be effective, the QA program should be
looked at as a management tool to assist in achieving
objectives and not only as a means of satisfying the
requirements of the NRC (10:474)
.
In 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission (now the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission) published Appendix B to
Title 10, Part 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Appendix B is entitled, "Quality Assurance Criteria for
Nuclear Power Plants." Appendix B has become the
foundation for all of the QA requirements that must be
strictly followed during the design, construction, and
operation of nuclear plants. This document delineates the
requirements and responsibilities through eighteen
criteria. Each of these must be addressed in the formal
QA program of each party involved in the construction
(4:350). The eighteen criteria are:
1. Organization
2. Quality Assurance Program
3. Design Control
4
.
Procurement Document Control
5. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings
6 Document Control
7. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and
Services
8. Identification and Control of Materials, Parts,
and Components
9. Control of Special Processes
10. Inspection
11. Test Control
12 Control of Measuring and Test Equipment
13. Handling, Storage, and Shipping
14. Inspection, Test, and Operating Status
15. Nonconforming Materials, Parts, and Components
16. Corrective Action
17. Quality Assurance Records
18. Audits (17:324)
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As illustrated by the number and type of areas covered,
the QA program for a nuclear power plant is quite
extensive and comprehensive. Consequently, the NRC's
requirements in QA are very time-consuming and costly.
Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 places the responsibility for
the establishment and execution of the total QA program on
the utility or owner. This function may be delegated to
contractors, agents, or consultants, but doing so does not
relieve the utility of any of its responsibilities under
the law. Before this requirement became effective in
1969, most utilities were using turnkey contracts for the
design and construction of nuclear power plants. However,
since the owner was made responsible for the QA program,
turnkey contracting became obsolete in the nuclear power
industry. Owners have been forced to take a more active
role in the engineering, procurement, and construction
phases of the project (4:354).
A wide variety of owner involvement in QA programs
has existed on nuclear projects in the United States. For
example, large public utilities, such as the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) , have conducted all the
engineering, procurement, and construction on their
projects. On the other extreme, small utilities that have
built only one nuclear power plant have delegated all
engineering and construction functions, including most of
the QA and QC functions, to an architect/engineering firm
or construction management firm. On a majority of
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projects the utilities have delegated most of the site-
related quality assurance functions to a contractor and
the utilities have performed audit functions on the
contractor's QA efforts (4:355).
The most common set-up for the overall QA
organization has been one where the site constructors
conducted first and second level QA/QC functions and the
utility maintained only a small staff at the project site.
This small staff was used for conducting the audits. The
utility would also have a small QA staff at the home
office to audit the QA programs of the various vendors and
material suppliers on the project (4:355).
Because of Appendix B's requirement that owners be
responsible for the overall quality of the project, many
utilities felt that minimum involvement (i.e. audit
functions only) was not sufficient. The trend has been
for the utility to retain more and more of the quality-
related inspection, surveillance, and auditing work. This
trend was exemplified in the construction of Florida Power
and Light Company's (FPL) St. Lucie Unit No. 2 Nuclear
Power Plant in Stuart, Florida. On this project, FPL
maintained direct control and responsibility for the site
QA and QC (16:11)
.
Florida Power and Light felt that having a separate
QA organization for surveillance only was a duplication of
effort that wasted valuable resources of manpower, time,
and money. FPL performed all site QA and QC activities on
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this project and delegated offsite QC functions, namely
vendor surveillance and design control, to its design
engineer/contractor. Management positions were staffed by
FPL employees, while a service contractor provided most of
the inspectors (16:13).
Another area of QA that has had an effect on nuclear
power plant construction is the requirement that:
"persons and organizations performing quality assurance
functions shall report to a management level such that
this required authority and organization freedom,
including sufficient independence from cost and schedule
when opposed to safety considerations are provided"
(17:621)
.
This requirement has affected the project
organization and the overall corporate organization of
utilities. Not only has it affected utilities, it has
also affected contractors and designers in the nuclear
power industry, since many QA functions have been
delegated to their level. The key words in the
requirement are "sufficient independence." Experienced
utilities, suppliers, and engineers have found that
sufficient independence could only be achieved by giving
the QA manager a position equal in authority to the
project manager or the departmental heads of engineering
and construction (4:354).
Probably the greatest effect on the industry caused
by the QA program has been the requirement that there be
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written procedures. The QA Program criterion of Appendix
B states:
The applicant shall establish at the earliest
practicable time, consistent with the schedule
for accomplishing the activities, a quality
assurance program which complies with the
requirements of this appendix. This program
shall be documented by written policies,
procedures, or instructions, and shall be
carried out throughout the plant life in
accordance with those policies, procedures, or
instructions (17:621).
This requirement is significantly different from the
typical construction project. Most construction projects
do not require written procedures and do not always adhere
strictly to the specifications. However, for nuclear
construction written procedures are a must and strict
compliance with the specifications is an absolute
requirement according to this Federal statute (4:356).
Because of the volume and complexity of operations
involved with a nuclear power plant, the requirement for
written procedures does have some merit. The QA program
must be followed throughout the life of the project. In
order to ensure that this is done, project personnel must
be given direct and clear guidance. Construction
procedures are written to ensure that each similar task is
performed the same way by each worker on the project. The
written procedures also provide assurance that each
operation is done in compliance with the project
specifications. The QC inspectors and QA personnel
receive their guidance through the written QA and QC
procedures. These procedures specify: the job that must
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be done, when it will be done, step-by-step details on how
the job will be done, the equipment required to do the
job, and the documentation required (4:357).
Because of the larqe number of activities on a
nuclear power plant, problems have arisen when written
procedures are too detailed. If the writing of procedures
is not done carefully and methodically the number of
procedures can rise to unmanageable levels. On one two-
unit nuclear power plant there were 108 construction
procedures and 4 3 QA/QC procedures (4:357).
Not only must the number of procedures be controlled,
but how the procedures are written must also be managed.
Very often the procedures are difficult for construction
personnel to follow or the procedures do not accomplish
their intended purpose. This causes extensive revisions,
which are costly and time consuming, both from an
administrative and a construction operations standpoint.
On the two-unit plant mentioned in the previous paragraph,
there were 3 67 construction procedure revisions and 119
QA/QC procedure revisions. Revisions are often necessary
to update procedures, but how many revisions are necessary
because of procedures that were not well planned and
prepared the first time (4:358)?
Each revision causes a logistics problem and
generates a large volume of paper. Each person who has a
copy of the original procedure must obtain an up to date
copy with the latest revision. Usually, a field change is
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approved before the official revision is published, so
everyone must also receive a copy of the field change.
Considering the large number of personnel involved with
the written procedures it can be easily seen that
procedures and their revisions can become a costly and
time consuming effort (4:358).
Another requirement of the QA Program criteria of
Appendix B is that the program must be able to provide
"verifiable objective evidence of quality performance"
(17:622). One aspect of this evidence is written
procedures. The other aspect is documentation of what has
transpired. This is done through field reports, testing,
and photographs. While there is a certain amount of
documentation that is necessary to ensure that the QA
program is working, documentation alone cannot ensure
quality.
The main focus of the entire QA program should be
producing a quality product, the paperwork provides the
assurance that quality was achieved. A survey of
management personnel directly responsible for QA in the
nuclear industry indicated that QA programs were too paper
oriented. Many of those surveyed stated that "industry
overreaction to regulatory requirements and resultant
overspecification of documentation requirements" was a
leading factor in unnecessary paper production. This
overreaction is probably due to the industry's desires to
ensure regulatory requirements are met. Quite frequently,
47

specifications were made more stringent than were required
to meet existing regulations (4:359).
The problem with overdocumentation can be illustrated
with a few examples. On one project it was estimated that
over 500,000 documents were generated from field
activities alone! On another project, the QC procedure
for tags and forms was a 66 page document which contained
53 different forms. One site that was studied revealed
that there were nine different forms that had to be
completed prior to each concrete placement (4:359). It is
easy to see how over half a million pages can be generated
when forms and records are required for each weld,
concrete placement, and numerous other activities. It is
also easy to determine how the administrative and overhead
effort required to generate, distribute, complete, and
maintain these documents can inflate the price of the
project.
The requirements of Appendix B are the subject of
much controversy and interpretation within the industry.
The differences in interpretation have been dramatic.
Utilities, suppliers, designers, contractors, and the
regulatory agencies have all had varying viewpoints on how
to interpret the requirements. Although Appendix B set
forth general requirements for QA programs, it was
apparent from the early stages of its use that
clarification of acceptable interpretations and specific
guidelines was needed. Much of this was accomplished
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through the various codes and standards of the national
societies, such as the American Concrete Institute (ACI)
and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) (4:351).
However, there are still many areas where the
industry failed to agree on acceptable interpretations.
Since the industry could not agree, the NRC published what
it felt were acceptable reguirements which would guarantee
that guality was obtained. These were published in the
form of NRC regulatory guides (4:352).
A regulatory guide is a description of an acceptable
method of implementing a specific NRC regulation. These
guides are developed with information and assistance from
industry. Within one category (related to power reactors)
there have been over 100 regulatory guides published with
more than 60 others in various stages of development. The
continuous revisions and clarifications of these guides
are the source of much frustration in the industry
(4:352) .
It is these revisions and clarifications that have
caused the unstable regulatory climate that has existed
for the past decade which has had a direct negative effect
on the industry. It has been extremely difficult for
utilities, designers, and contractors to plan, design, and
construct nuclear power plants to a specific timetable and
budget when the regulations are constantly changing.
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CHAPTER 6
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
With construction costs escalating at a rapid rate,
one of the major problems facing construction managers on
nuclear power plants is how to obtain more effective and
efficient use of resources. Time management is a critical
area of planning that involves a major resource in
construction. It is especially critical in nuclear power
plant construction because of their size and complexity
(2:1).
During the mid-1980' s, a study of nuclear power
plants in the United States indicated that poor time
management was a significant problem in their
construction. Many construction companies possess the
tools and techniques available to manage time, however,
this possession is no guarantee that a project will be
completed successfully. A basic framework for time
management should be established and utilized by the
entire construction organization. It should be
comprehensive, yet clear enough so that external groups
can understand how it works. The four processes that make
up this basic framework are: planning, estimating,
scheduling, and control (2:2).
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Effective planning is essential for the successful
completion of nuclear plants. Historically, the most
successful projects have had quality planning from their
inception. Quality planning is more than just generating
paperwork by some group in management. Engineering,
operations, construction, maintenance, staff departments
(i.e. QC, radiological controls, purchasing), suppliers,
subcontractors and top management must all participate in
order for the plan to be realistic and effective (2:2).
The planning process should consist of developing an
outline on: what has to be done, when it has to be done,
how it will be done, and who will do it. This is common
to planning any endeavor. However, for a nuclear power
plant some other conditions must also be met. First, the
planning group must know and understand the strategy to be
followed—what methods and procedures will be used, the
lines of authority and responsibility of the many
organizations involved in the project, and what accuracy
the planning process is expected to achieve. Secondly,
the involvement of all project members is required for an
effective plan that will be accepted and committed to by
everyone. Third, major milestones must be established,
with each milestone linked to a specific deliverable item
or result. Last, a good work breakdown structure must be
developed. Because of the size and complexity of a
nuclear power plant, the requirements of information
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integration and communication are much greater than those
normally encountered on other construction projects (2:2).
If the planning process is done correctly, the entire
organization should understand it and the individual
project groups will be committed to making the plan work.
The next phase in time management, estimating, will be
much easier because: an overall strategy for the project
has been developed, milestones and results have been
identified, and the work breakdown structure has been
established.
Even with all of the sophisticated techniques
available in the construction industry for estimating,
this phase of planning for a nuclear plant can only be
accomplished with a limited degree of accuracy. The major
limitations on estimating accurately are the many
uncertainties associated with regulations, resources, and
working conditions. Even though it is often difficult to
estimate activity durations with assured accuracy, it is
not totally impossible. Using the WBS, historical data,
and information from the group actually performing the
work, a reasonably accurate estimate can be made (2:3).
The estimators must determine the resources reguired
to accomplish planned activities along with the
constraints and limitations that may affect the duration
of the activity. Interfaces and interference between
resources should be identified, and the impact of each
determined. When estimating activity durations on a
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nuclear power plant, the constraints of: access,
regulatory procedures, security, training, and radiation
exposure limits must all be considered. All of these
areas will limit productivity and the availability of
resources. This in turn will lengthen the activity
durations (2:3)
.
With the resources and constraints identified, the
project activities can be analyzed to determine duration.
As many alternatives as possible should be evaluated as to
their feasibility. Each feasible alternative should be
carefully reviewed to obtain a duration. After realistic
activity durations have been established, the next phase
of time management, scheduling, becomes somewhat easier
(2:3) .
Effective scheduling of a nuclear power plant
requires a degree of construction management skills above
just being able to produce a CPM schedule. It requires
communication of information processing skills in order to
define the schedule objectives and the administrative
support necessary to use the schedule for it's intended
purpose—the control of project time. Effective
scheduling also requires the ability to acquire the
necessary resources and the commitment of top management
to the schedule (2:3).
The scheduling process consists of recognizing the
time and resource restraints that will influence the
execution of the project plan. More sophisticated project
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scheduling functions involve: determining interdependency
between tasks, placing each task in sequence based on
these interdependencies, placing the sequence of tasks in
real time (on a calendar) , analysis of the schedule for
constraints and alternatives, and finalizing the schedule
(7).
After completing the above activities the schedule
should be written in a format which can be communicated to
the project members for their use in monitoring progress.
Before the schedule is officially adopted and issued, it
should be reviewed by everyone involved in the project.
Any questions and problems that arise during this review
should be discussed and resolved (2:4).
As with any construction project, the schedule is an
extremely useful tool in controlling time and costs.
However, the construction management team should realize
that planning, estimating, and scheduling can easily get
out of control on a nuclear project. These processes
typically become an end to themselves and prevent the
efficient use they were intended to provide.
For the schedule to remain effective it must be
easily adaptable to the changes in scope, resources, and
regulations that are inevitable on a nuclear project. To
achieve adaptability, the schedule should be prepared in a
format that can accommodate changes through a formal
revision process. Project personnel must collectively
understand and believe in the schedule if the project is
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to be a success. "It is a serious mistake to believe that
the performance of the project can be controlled simply by
monitoring the schedule" (2:4).
Monitoring is an effective means for identifying out-
of-control situations. However, the project must be
controlled in regards to the schedule in order to be
successful. The control process involves: collecting
data, identifying variances and analyzing their impact,
reporting variances, evaluating the alternatives for
corrective action, and selecting and implementing the
right alternative (2:5).
In nuclear power plant construction for the control
process to work, other factors must be taken into
consideration. A formal and clearly defined control
organization is an absolute necessity. With clearly
defined roles, tasks, and responsibilities, role conflicts
between the players are minimized and confusion over
accountability is reduced. The management tools used for
defining responsibilities are: work tasks and performance
standards, task matrices, organizational charters,
organizational input/output statements, personnel rosters,
and regularly scheduled meetings (2:5).
The most important job of the control organization is
to communicate the real project status to the project
players, top management, and other involved parties
(i.e. major vendors, the NRC) . An effective reporting
system should be established to provide project status at
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the proper level of detail and frequency. The reports
should be provided to those people in the organization who
have the ability and authority to make decisions. For
this group, controlling the project performance means
helping project personnel, collectively, to stay on top of
the work and identify problems while they are small, or
before they occur. Doing this provides the control group
with more assistance and support in problem solving
throughout the life of the project, which will inevitably
lead to project success (2:5).
The control process, if done correctly, involves the
control and performance organizations. These two groups
working together provide insight into the many intricacies
of a nuclear power plant project and the methods that can
be used to manage time and reduce costs. This fosters
teamwork and a total commitment toward reaching each
critical project milestone which leads to overall project
success.
The control process involves four main areas:
schedule, cost, material, and quality. Each of these
areas is interrelated and deficiencies in one area usually
result in problems with the other areas. Previously this
chapter discussed the organizational format and functions
of scheduling and control organizations. The next section
of this chapter will review the types of project
schedules, cost estimates, and material controls typically
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utilized for nuclear power plant construction. Quality
control is discussed in a separate chapter of this report.
The schedule control system is comprised of several
different types of schedules. The Main Event Time Scaled
Schedule is the initial and principal schedule from which
all the other project schedules evolve. It is manually
prepared and usually contains forty to one hundred key
events. It does not contain nonevent-related
contingencies such as strikes, unusually severe weather,
and design changes. The Official Project Schedule is a
detailed computerized schedule that incorporates all
essential engineering, procurement, construction, and
testing activities. It is only "official" until it is
formally superseded by another Official Project Schedule
(10:472)
.
The Simulation Schedule is an interim step between a
proposed change in the existing Official Project Schedule
and the production of a new official schedule. It is a
series of integrative computer printouts that updates the
official schedule. The Schedule Status Reports are
physically identical to an Official Project Schedule, but
reflect the current status of the project and indicate the
deviations from the official schedule (10:473).
The project managers and planning and scheduling
engineers implement the Official Project Schedule. The
planning and scheduling engineers update the computer on a
periodic basis to reflect the current status of the
57

project and issue the Schedule Status Report. This report
indicates the deviations from the official schedule that
will occur if corrective steps are not made. When project
management does not think that the deviations can be
corrected by logic changes, additional manpower, or
improved productivity, the planning and scheduling
engineers do simulation runs to develop a new simulated
schedule that is submitted for approval to project
management. When approved, a new Official Project
Schedule is issued and the cycle is repeated throughout
the life of the project (10:473).
Cost control, to be effective, must be based on
accurate estimates. For nuclear power plant construction
several different types of estimates are used from
inception to completion of the project. They maybe called
different names but are generally known as: order of
magnitude estimates, preliminary detailed estimates, and
definitive estimates (5)
.
Order of magnitude estimates are prepared during the
early stages of the project and updated regularly. These
estimates are based on historical data and have a low
degree of accuracy. They are applied during the
conceptual engineering and design phase. Preliminary
detailed estimates are issued shortly after the
preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) is submitted to
the NRC. These estimates are established for the purpose
of monitoring the full range of project costs at all
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levels of detail. These estimates are updated
periodically, usually every six months. The definitive
estimate is prepared upon awarding the construction
permit. It provides the greatest degree of accuracy at
the time it is prepared. It is based on quotations for
major pieces of equipment, the construction materials, and
a detailed labor survey (10:472).
A computerized system is used to disseminate cost
estimates and to incorporate cost control feedback into
the system. The computer develops and generates different
reports for the use of corporate management, project
management, and field personnel (10:472).
Project material control is also essential in
tracking and reducing cost overruns. Computer programming
is utilized to assign the direct responsibility for on-
time procurement to an individual in the responsible
organization. Each significant equipment or material item
is identified and tracked by computer from procurement to
final delivery.
The computer is also used to develop several reports
which assist management and field personnel in material
control. The Master Listing contains the entire material
file and provides: system code, description, responsible
individual, vendor, purchase order number, quantity info,
order date, and special codes. The Warehousing Report
lists all ordered items that have not been received. The
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Expediting Report itemizes those items that are overdue or
due to be shipped within 90 days (10:473).
This chapter has reviewed a model process for
managing a nuclear power plant construction project. Also
discussed were the typical reports being used and their
implementation in regard to schedule, cost, and material
control. The last portion of this chapter will review
what construction managers in the nuclear industry think
of planning, schedule performance, and cost control. The
survey, conducted in conjunction with a MBA thesis project
at New York University Graduate School of Business
Administration, was taken in 1978, at a time when nuclear
power plant construction was almost at it's peak in the
United States. The results are merely used in this report
to emphasize and provide insight into those areas
pertaining to construction management that need improving.
Two hundred thirty-four individuals from public utilities,
architect/engineer firms, and construction firms were
surveyed (15:491).
A majority of those surveyed indicated that
construction planning is in need of the most improvement.
The second area most frequently mentioned as needing
improvement was the direction of construction operations,
and the third was construction performance review and
evaluation (15:492).
The planning task was further broken down and rated
by level of importance, and current performance (strong or
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weak) . The following areas of planning were rated both
high in importance and weak in performance:
1. Input to licensing and engineering activities
concerning commitment to practicality and design
feasibility.
2
.
Plant construction activity planning and
scheduling.
3. Construction methods planning, including
introduction of innovative techniques.
4 Construction organization and administrative
planning.
It is interesting to note that Item 1 received this rating
from an exceptionally high number of respondents (46%)
(15:494)
.
The survey also attempted to identify other areas of
construction planning that if emphasized would improve
overall performance. Among these areas were: material
planning, expansion of construction performance planning
into more diverse areas, manpower and labor resource
planning, estimating and cost control, and preparation of
start-up activities (15:495).
Field direction of operations was considered by many
of those surveyed as the second most important management
category regarding nuclear projects. Despite extensive
management efforts in planning, review, and evaluation,
overall project success is greatly dependent upon
direction of construction operations. The top four areas
rated in this category were:
1. Obtaining timely engineering information.
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2.
Completion of construction activities on
schedule.
3 Maintaining unit performance per estimate
(project cost performance)
.
4. Obtaining materials and equipment.
(15:496)
.
The survey also asked the respondents to list
additional management tasks where current industry
performance is weak. The following items were at the top
of the list:
1. Day-to-day planning and scheduling of
construction activities.
2. Maintenance of quality control requirements and
integration of quality control activities with
construction
.
3. Construction leadership and supervision.
4 Communication and coordination with other
departments
.
When asked how to improve performance in the area of
construction operations the following responses were given
by a majority of the construction managers surveyed: more
detailed planning, greater development of the
engineering/construction interface, and staffing by more
experienced personnel (15:498).
Regarding construction performance review and
evaluation, total cost to completion forecasting was
judged weak by over half of the respondents. Also rated
as weak were: overall construction completion status and
specific activity completion status. Most of the
responses indicated that review and evaluation tasks were
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performed by construction supervisors, rather than an
independent group (15:498).
The results of the survey suggested that improved
performance was needed. Improved performance could be
achieved by correcting problems mostly on an individual
project level. Greater resources should be applied to
planning tasks on future nuclear projects. This requires
a larger and more experienced planning staff.
Construction planners should concentrate on review of
project licensing commitments and construction input to
project engineering and design. The plans should include
greater flexibility for response to the inevitable change
experienced during nuclear construction (15:499).
Direction of construction operations could be
improved by making every effort to free supervision of
extraneous tasks. This allows for concentration of the
construction supervisors on those activities essential for
efficient work performance. Coordination and
communication should be emphasized. Because of the
pressures and stresses experienced by managers on nuclear
construction sites it is important that training and
professional development of personnel be given top
consideration of management. Job assignments should be
made in consideration of professional development
(15:500)
.
Although this survey was conducted in 1978 the points
it raised and the areas identified for improvement are
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certainly relevant today. Many people in the nuclear
industry have placed the blame on government regulations
as being the sole cause of the decline in the nuclear
power plant construction industry in the United States.
As this survey indicated the construction industry has
much room for improvement in it's management of nuclear
projects. It is interesting to note that during the rapid
escalation of costs and extreme schedule overruns that
occurred during the late 1970' s and through the 1980' s the
construction industry and utility companies were blaming
the NRC and it's regulatory process. The NRC on the other
hand, was claiming that poor management and declining
productivity of construction labor was causing the cost
overruns and schedule extensions. Since that time the NRC
has recognized that the licensing process is partially to
blame for the problems. The construction industry has
realized that there are many areas of improvement,
especially in management that can reduce cost and improve
schedule performance.
This chapter has identified a model process for
managing the construction of a nuclear power plant,
provided a review of the different methods used by the
industry to track and control costs, schedules, and
materials. Also, specific areas of improvement identified
by construction managers were reviewed.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to gain insight on the problems with
the nuclear power industry I conducted an interview with
Dr. Jack O'hanian, Assistant Dean, College of Engineering,
University of Florida. Dr. O'hanian is the immediate
Past-President of the American Nuclear Society. The
American Nuclear Society is a non-profit organization of
engineers, scientists, and educators dedicated to the
advancement of engineering and science related to nuclear
science and technology and the integration of the
scientific and management disciplines of nuclear science
(14) .
As indicated by his comments, Dr. O'hanian' s thoughts
reflect many of the same ideas that were looked at in this
study. The interview was conducted on Jun 26, 1991. The
following is a review of Dr. O'hanian's comments:
Two issues have contributed significantly
to the decline of nuclear power in this country.
The first issue is economics. American
utilities were overly optimistic in their
projections of electricity demand for the '70*s
and '80's. Nuclear power plants were ordered in
the '60's and '70's based on these projections.
The oil embargo of 1973 caused conservation
efforts to take place and electrical demand
decreased to the point where nuclear power was
not as cost effective as originally anticipated.
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The second issue is the licensing process,
which is interrelated to public opinion. The
French, who generate 75% of their electricity
with nuclear power (and will probably reach 80%
by 1995) have no problems with licensing. They
have one standardized reactor design and one
utility company. They also have no other
alternative fuel choices. In the United States,
we have over 3000 utility companies, 60 of which
are in the nuclear business and many different
designs for our reactors. The public is not
convinced that nuclear power is safe and is not
willing to give up its chance at a second public
hearing, even though Congress is contemplating
legislation which would require only one hearing
and one license. Since the public does not
appear to be willing to forego the second
hearing, it is doubtful that Congress will
either. There is likely to remain a
"confirmatory hearing" at the end of
construction to ensure the plant has been built
to specifications. The people are not in favor
of nuclear power. Everyone thinks it's a good
idea until plans are announced to put a plant in
their own backyard.
On standardization, the most likely choice
will be the advanced light water reactor. The
designs are being finalized now and one (nuclear
plant) could probably start construction in two
to three years. The gas-cooled reactors (MHTGR)
are a good design, but no one has much
experience with them. Therefore, no one wants
to take the financial risk of experimenting to
see how they work. Two gas-cooled plants have
been built in the United States. One has never
operated properly and has had its license
removed by the NRC.
I have had some experience with actual
construction of nuclear plants. My observation
is that much depends on the utility and how they
tackle nuclear construction. A crucial factor
is to what extent the owner controls the
construction. A good example is the St. Lucie
Power Plant owned by Florida Power and Light.
The owner was almost totally involved in every
phase of the construction and the plant was
built in about six years. In my opinion
constructing a nuclear power plant is like any
other project, if the right people are put on
the job and the job is managed properly, there
will be few problems and the plant will be built
as intended.
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Have you ever heard of Admiral Rickover?
(My answer to this question was a definite yes.
I explained to Dr. O'hanian that I had been
interviewed by Admiral Rickover in 1981, prior
to my entry into the Navy's submarine training
program.) He was always after the best in the
Navy's nuclear power program. His attitude of
excellence and care is one that we need to
emulate. Our motto has to be "do it right the
first time."
The accidents at Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl made a big difference. After Three
Mile Island, the nuclear industry and the NRC
realized that changes were required in many
areas of nuclear power if the industry was to
survive. For the most part these corrections
have been made and the industry is in much
better shape today. Chernobyl scared everyone.
The public does not understand what type of
plant Chernobyl was and what actually happened
there. That type of accident could not possibly
occur in the United States because we operate a
totally different system. Chernobyl did cause
an international review of nuclear plants and
their operations with emphasis on the Soviet
Union and other Eastern bloc countries.
A lot of the problems with the industry
depend on attitude. Everyone, by everyone, I
mean all of us in the nuclear industry worldwide
have realized that there is no such thing as a
local accident. An accident at any nuclear
plant in the world affects everyone. We are all
in this together (14)
.
Nuclear power plant construction in the United States
has declined rapidly during the past fifteen years. There
are many reasons for this decline, but the critical ones
are: the current two-step licensing process that requires
public hearings at each phase of licensing, unstable
regulatory conditions that prevent proper control of
construction costs and schedules, the lack of a
standardized design or a group of standardized designs,
the public's negative opinion of nuclear power, and the
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failure of the construction industry to adequately prepare
itself to deal with the complexities of building nuclear
power plants.
By the year 2 030, the demand for electricity in the
United States is expected to increase 3 00% over the
country's current generating capacity (6:57). Because of
recent problems with oil exporting countries in the Middle
East and environmental concerns fossil-fuel plants are no
longer the optimum choice for utility companies. Nuclear
power is once again emerging as an alternative for
producing clean, efficient, and cheap electricity in this
country. However, to remain consistent as a primary
source of energy, nuclear power must overcome the problems
which has caused its decline during the past fifteen
years.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For nuclear power to again become a viable energy
source those involved in the industry must make a
concerted effort to educate the public on its many
virtues. Environmental concerns, economics, and the
industry's safety record are the key issues that should be
highlighted to emphasize to the public the advantages of
nuclear power. Once the public is again in favor of
nuclear power, then the industry must do everything
possible to ensure that no significant accidents occur
that would negatively sway public opinion.
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Congress generally follows public opinion in enacting
legislation or reforming legislation. After Congress is
convinced that the public wants nuclear power, the
licensing process should be changed through new or revised
legislation. The licensing procedure must be streamlined
so that utility companies and construction managers can
reasonably estimate the time and costs involved with
designing and construction nuclear power plants. A one-
step procedure with the license issued prior to
construction and the approval of the plant tied directly
to the issuance of this license is crucial to removing the
risks involved from not accurately estimating the cost and
duration of plant construction.
Also related to government control and reform are the
NRC's requirements. The regulatory guidelines must be
revised to allow for construction to be completed without
constant design changes. These constant design changes
create another unnecessary risk that the owner and
contractor should not have to manage. Also, the public
should not be forced into paying for these risks in the
form of increased electrical rates.
Finally, the government and industry should strive
toward developing a standardized design or a group of
standardized designs that can be built within a certain
range of the cost and schedule estimates. The experience
factor related to building the same plant on a repetitive
basis will ultimately cause the construction costs and
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durations to decrease. This will also improve
operability, safety, and maintainability for the entire
industry. Another advantage of standardized design is
improvement in the ability of the NRC to more quickly
review the design and issue licenses faster.
The recommendations made in this report have been
extracted from my study of the problems that have
confronted nuclear power for the past two decades. The
resolution of the problems facing the nuclear power
industry will require an extremely coordinated and
concerted effort from all the parties involved—the
public, the industry, government regulatory agencies, the
Administration, Congress, and the environmentalists. The
effort to revive the nuclear power construction industry
in the United States will certainly not be an easy one.
I recommend that future research be conducted on the
effects of public opinion on the industry, especially in
regard to construction cost and schedule overruns
resulting from public intervention in the licensing
process. Also, the current legislative reform efforts in
Congress should be closely followed to determine if major
revisions will be made to the regulations that will favor
standardization and lessen financial risks for owners and
contractors.
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GLOSSARY
ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR: A new reactor design that
provides for improvement over the current LWRs that are
operating. Light water describes the type of primary
coolant that is used to remove the heat of fission from
the reactor core.
APPENDIX B: An appendix to Title 10, Part 50 of the
United States Code of Federal Regulations that defines the
quality assurance and quality control requirements for
commercial nuclear power plants.
CHERNOBYL: Site of a major nuclear accident that occurred
in April 1986, in the Soviet Union.
CONTAINMENT BUILDING: Building that is constructed around
the reactor and its major systems that is a key design
feature in preventing release of radioactive material into
the atmosphere.
CORE MELTDOWN: Term used to describe an event that occurs
when decay heat is not removed fast enough from the
reactor core, causing the fission process to increase at
an accelerated rate, producing enough heat to melt the
reactor core.
DECAY HEAT: Additional heat that is generated from the
fission process after the reactor has been shutdown.
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH: Design concept utilized in the United
States to provide for maximum safety in the operation of
nuclear power plants.
GREENHOUSE GASES: Gases released into the atmosphere that
contribute to the greenhouse effect.
MODULAR HIGH-TEMPERATURE GAS COOLED REACTOR: Reactor
design that uses helium gas as a heat transport mechanism.
Currently being studied as a standardization option.
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE: Term used by the industry to describe
the overall process of nuclear fuel, from the extraction
of the uranium ore to the disposal of radioactive waste.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: Independent agency of the
United States Department of Energy that provides oversight
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on all facets of commercial nuclear power, especially
design, construction, and operation.
RADIOACTIVITY-INDUCED PROMPT FATALITIES: Death caused by-
instantaneous exposure to radiation, as opposed to death
caused by long term exposure to radiation.
RASMUSSEN REPORT (WASH-1400) : Report from a study
commissioned by the Nuclear Regulatory Agency in 1975 to
study the risks involved with nuclear accidents.
STANDARDIZATION: Concept where a single design or a small
group of designs is utilized to construct all the nuclear
power plants vice having each plant custom-designed and
built.
10 CFR 50: Title 10, Part 50 of the United States Code of
Federal Regulations that regulates all facets of
commercial nuclear power.
THREE MILE ISLAND: Site of a nuclear accident that
occurred in March 1979, in Pennsylvania.
TWO-STEP LICENSING: Current licensing procedure used for
nuclear power plants. It requires two separate licensing
steps, one prior to starting construction, and the second
prior to commencing operation of the plant.
VITRIFICATION: Process that uses extremely high
temperatures to convert radioactive wastes into a glassy-
like substance in order to reduce its volume and provide
for ease of storage.
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